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Abstract
Experimental research on behavior and cognition frequently rests on
stimulus or subject selection where not all characteristics can be fully
controlled, even when attempting strict matching. For example, when
contrasting patients to controls, variables such as intelligence or socioe-
conomic status are often correlated with patient status. Similarly, when
presenting word stimuli, variables such as word frequency are often corre-
lated with primary variables of interest. One procedure very commonly
employed to control for such nuisance effects is conducting inferential tests
on confounding stimulus or subject characteristics. For example, if word
length is not significantly different for two stimulus sets, they are consid-
ered as matched for word length. Such a test has high error rates and
is conceptually misguided. It reflects a common misunderstanding of sta-
tistical tests: interpreting significance not to refer to inference about a
particular population parameter, but about 1. the sample in question, 2.
the practical relevance of a sample difference (so that a nonsignificant test
is taken to indicate evidence for the absence of relevant differences). We
show inferential testing for assessing nuisance effects to be inappropriate
both pragmatically and philosophically, present a survey showing its high
prevalence, and briefly discuss an alternative in the form of regression
including nuisance variables.
1 Introduction
Methods sections in many issues of Brain & Language and similar journals
feature sentences such as
Animate and inanimate words chosen as stimulus materials did not
differ in word frequency (p > 0.05).
Controls and aphasics did not differ in age (p > 0.05).
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In the following, we discuss the inappropriateness of this practice. A common
problem in brain and behavioral research, where the experimenter cannot freely
determine every stimulus and participant characteristic, is the control of con-
founding/nuisance variables. This is especially common in studies of language.
Typically, word stimuli cannot be constructed out of whole cloth, but must be
chosen from existing words (which differ in many aspects). Stimuli are processed
by subjects in the context of a rich vocabulary; and subject populations have usu-
ally been exposed to very diverse environments and events in their acquisition
of language. A similar problem exists, for example, when comparing controls
to specific populations, such as bilingual individuals or slow readers. The basic
problem researchers are faced with is then to prevent reporting e.g. an effect
of word length, or bilingualism, when the effect truly stems from differences
in word frequency, or socioeconomic status, which may be correlated with the
variable of interest. A prevalent method we find in the literature, namely in-
ferential null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) of stimuli, fails to perform
the necessary control.
1.1 NHST and nuisance control
Often, researchers will attempt to demonstrate that stimuli or participants are
selected so as to concentrate their differences on the variable of interest, i.e. re-
duce confounds, by conducting null-hypothesis testing such as t-tests or ANOVA
on the potential confound in addition to or even instead of showing descriptive
statistics in the form of measures of location and scale. The underlying intuition
is that these tests establish whether two conditions differ in a given aspect and
serve as proof that the conditions are “equal” on it. This is, in turn, based on the
related, but also incorrect intuition that significance in NHST establishes that
a contrast shows a meaningful effect, and the related issue that non-significant
tests indicate the absence of meaningful effects.
In practice, we find insignificant tests are used as a necessary (and often suffi-
cient) condition for accepting a stimulus set as “controlled”. This approach fails
on multiple levels.
• Philosophically, these tests are inferential tests being performed on closed
populations, not random samples of larger populations. Statistical testing
attempts to make inferences about the larger population based on ran-
domly selected samples. Here, the “samples” are not taken randomly, and
we are not interested in the population they are drawn from, but in the
stimuli or subjects themselves. For example, in a study on the effects of
animacy in language processing, we do not care whether the class of ani-
mate nouns in the language is on average more frequent than the class of
inanimate nouns. Instead, we care whether the selection of animate nouns
in our stimuli are on average more frequent than the selection of inanimate
nouns in our stimuli. But inferential tests answer the former question, not
the latter. Tests refer to the population of stimuli that will largely not
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be used, or the population of subjects that will not be investigated in the
study.
• Pragmatically, beyond being inappropriate, this procedure does not test
a hypothesis of interest. This procedure tests the null hypothesis of “the
populations that these stimuli were sampled from do not differ in this
feature”, but what we are actually interested in is “the differences in this
feature between conditions is not responsible for any observed effects”. In
other words, this procedure tests whether the conditions differ in a certain
respect to a measurable degree, but not whether that difference actually
has any meaningful influence on the result.
• Additionally, these tests carry all the usual problems of Null Hypothesis
Significance Testing (cf. Cohen 1992), including its inability to “accept”
the null hypothesis directly. This means that even if the conditions do
not differ significantly, we cannot accept the hypothesis that they do not
differ; we can only say that there is not enough evidence to exclude this
hypothesis (which we are not actually interested in). In typical contexts
(e.g. setting the Type I rate to the conventional 5% level), the power to
reject the null hypothesis of no differences is low (Button et al. 2013)
due to a small number of items, meaning that even comparatively large
differences may be undetected, while in larger sets, even trivially small
differences may be rejected. Especially with small samples (e.g., 10 sub-
jects per group, or 20 items per condition), the probability of detecting
moderate confound effects is thus low – even if there are substantial dif-
ferences, tests will not reject the null hypothesis, and stimulus sets might
be accepted as being balanced based on a test with a low probability of
rejecting even moderately imbalanced samples of such a size.
In other words, these tests are incapable of actually informing us about the in-
fluence of potential confounds, but may give researchers a false sense of security.
This inferential stage offers no benefit beyond examining the descriptive mea-
sures of location and scale (e.g. mean and standard deviation) and determining
if the stimuli groups are “similar enough”. For perceptual experiments, there
may even be established discrimination thresholds below which the differences
are considered indistinguishable. A preferred approach is directly examining to
what extent these potential confounds have an influence on the results, such
as by including these confounds in the statistical model. This is often read-
ily implemented via multiple regression, particularly “mixed-effect” approaches
(Gelman and Hill 2006; Fox 2016).
1.2 Randomization checks in clinical research
In the context of baseline differences between treatment and control groups in
clinical trials, a similar debate has been waged (e.g. Senn 1994) under the
term “randomization check” as it refers to checking if assignment of subjects to
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treatments has truly been performed randomly. In interventional clinical trials,
assignment can indeed be truly random (unlike in the kind of study in brain
and behavioral sciences we are referring to here). Yet even here, inferential tests
have been judged inappropriate for achieving their intended aims. Nonetheless,
the clinical trial literature provides important considerations for experimental
design choices, e.g. the proper way of blocking and matching (Imai, King, and
Stuart 2008), and can thus inform preparing stimulus sets or participant groups
even for non-clinical experiments.
2 Prevalence
We performed a literature survey of neurolinguistic studies to estimate the preva-
lence of inferential tests of nuisance variables (see below for further details).
2.1 Qualitative impressions
Instances of the error can be easily found not only in the literature, such as this
example from the 1980s:
the two prime categories were equivalent in text frequency [. . . ], and
in length (both t’s < 1.1)
Here, the authors deduce equivalence (acceptance of the null) from a failed test
(i.e. a test where the null cannot be rejected), with regards to the population
of stimuli they did not present rather than the sample at hand. To estimate
how common the problem is in neurolinguistics, a high-quality neurolinguistic
journal, Brain & Language, was investigated.
2.2 Quantitative prevalence of the problem in recent is-
sues of Brain & Language
In total, 86 articles were found where researchers reported known quantities
(e.g. perfectly measurable characteristics of a fixed set of stimuli) in their stim-
ulus/materials section, and 58 (67%) of these reported inferential statistics of
these known values. Of these, 47 (81%) “accepted” the null hypothesis (i.e.,
implicitly assumed that stimuli or subjects were matched following a nonsignifi-
cant test). We conclude that in a large fraction of those cases, where researchers
published in B&L are concerned about confounds of subject groups or experi-
mental stimuli, they conduct inappropriate tests and misinterpret the results of
these tests in a potentially misleading manner.
Representative statements from every study committing an error as well as
further details on the precise survey methodology are available online at
https://github.com/jona-sassenhagen/statfail.
4
3 Simulation
We performed a simulation to investigate the impact of inferential tests of con-
founding variables. In particular, we find that when the correlation between the
confounding covariate and the outcome measure is not perfect, testing covari-
ates (instead of their effect on the outcome variable) can lead to unnecessary
rejections of manipulations as “confounded” in 50% or more of studies for even
large effects.1
The results of this simulation for various settings (e.g. effect size, confound size,
etc.) are available online on RPubs (http://rpubs.com/palday/statfail), while
an interactive version is available online at ShinyApps (https://palday.shinyapps.io/statfail/).
All source code (in R) is available via Zenodo (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.58750),
including the ability to run the simulation on a local computer.
4 Discussion and recommendation
In sum, NHST control of nuisance variables is prevalent and inappropriate,
based on a flawed application of statistics to an irrelevant hypothesis. Proper
nuisance control (of known and measurable variables) is not complex, although
it can require more effort and computer time.
Researchers should still use descriptive statistics to demonstrate the success of
balancing. That is, quantifying e.g. differences between stimuli via variances,
raw means and standardized means (Cohen’s d), and correlation coefficients,
which many researchers already often do, can be highly informative, and should
be routinely done. For more complex designs, cross-correlation matrices can
visualize the degree of confounding. In contrast, p values from statistical tests
on the stimulus properties offer no reliable, objective guideline.
To directly and objectively estimate the influence of a set of stimuli on the depen-
dent variables of interest, researchers can include confounds in their statistical
model for the data. For traditional t-tests, ANOVAs and regression models, this
corresponds to using multiple regression with the confounds as additional nui-
sance factors (including continuous factors). In multiple regression, all parame-
ters are jointly estimated, and assuming the assumptions of the linear model are
fulfilled (including all relevant variables being present and homoskedasticity of
errors) and the included variables are reliably measured (Westfall and Yarkoni
2016), these estimates are unbiased (in the sense of a Best Linear Unbiased
Estimator). Thus, a manipulation effect estimated by a model also containing
nuisance variables corresponds to the effect of manipulation while accounting
120 items each for 2 groups, Cohen’s d = 2 for manipulation, Pearson’s r = 0.75 between
feature and dependent variable; rejection rate > 60% with Cohen’s d = 1 for covariate between
groups, rejection rate = 75% with Cohen’s d = 2 for covariate between groups. See the full
output on RPubs (http://rpubs.com/palday/statfail) for more information.
5
for nuisance influence. Importantly, to prevent p-value “fishing”, the choice of
selecting covariates to include must be made on principled grounds, either a
priori or via unbiased model selection procedures.
Hierarchical/multilevel modeling (a.k.a mixed-effects modeling; see also Pin-
heiro and Bates 2000; Gelman and Hill 2006; Fox 2016) provides the necessary
extension to the regression procedure for repeated-measures designs. Multilevel
regression models (computed with e.g lme4 (Bates et al. 2015)) have the addi-
tional advantage of accounting for the combined variance of subjects and items
in one model (Clark 1973; Baayen, Davidson, and Bates 2008; Judd, Westfall,
and Kenny 2012) and automatically provide a summary of correlation between
effects.
One problem in this context is that these stimulus confounds are often cor-
related with one another, the dependent variables, and the independent vari-
ables of interest (e.g., word frequency and word length correlate). Under mul-
ticollinearity, standard errors may be inflated. The main technique for dealing
with collinearity is one that researchers traditionally already employ: attempt-
ing to balance stimulus/subject selection so that differences in confounds are
minimised, e.g. via matching or blocking. That is, matching should generally
still be performed in addition to multivariate estimation.
Finally, effective parameter estimation in complex regression models requires
more data, as power is lost with each additional parameter being estimated. We
view this as a good thing because studies in the brain and behavioral sciences
are chronically underpowered (Button et al. 2013).
Thus, our recommendations for nuisance control are:
• attempt to match nuisance variables to a reasonable degree
• use descriptive, but not inferential statistics to guide stimulus selection
• add potentially confounding variables as covariates into the final data
analysis process
• use larger samples to provide adequate power
Each step in this list is (hopefully) uncontroversial and helpful, unlike null-
hypothesis testing of stimulus balance.
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6 Methods
6.1 Survey
The analysis was restricted to current volumes. For all articles published by
B&L from 2011 to the 3rd issue of 2013, three raters (not blinded to the pur-
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pose of the experiment) investigated all published experimental papers (exclud-
ing reviews, simulation studies, editorials etc.). For each experiment reported
in a study, the stimulus/materials sections were investigated for descriptive and
inferential statistics derived from populations that were exhaustively sampled
without error. If a descriptive and/or inferential statistic (such as mean and
standard deviation) were reported, the study was coded as one where the re-
searchers were interested in a known quantity, otherwise it was discarded. If an
inferential statistic (such as a p-value) was reported, the study was coded as one
where researchers answered that interest with an erroneous parameter estimate,
otherwise as one where researchers did not commit the error. If a statement
of the form that groups were thought equivalent regarding the parameter was
made, such as claims that they were “matched”, “equal” or “did not differ”, and
this statement was backed up by a p-value greater than 0.05, the study was
coded as “accepting the null”. In cases of rater disagreement, the majority vote
was registered. Representative statements from studies committing an error are
available online at https://github.com/jona-sassenhagen/statfail.
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